

## ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ZIMBABWE

BY

MR. KARL E. PRINSLOW  
Department of Army Civilian

### DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.  
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2010

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>				<i>Form Approved</i> <b>OMB No. 0704-0188</b>	
<small>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b></small>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 19-03-2010		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Strategy Research Project		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Economic Sanctions and Zimbabwe				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Mr. Karl E. Prinslow				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Colonel Thomas Sheperd Department of National Security and Strategy				<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Distribution A: Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> <p>The policy option of economic sanctions has become more popular and frequently invoked since the end of the Cold War. This is despite continuing debate as to their effectiveness even with the creation of new 'smart', or targeted, sanctions in response to changing geo-political conditions and situational objectives. This paper will summarize some of the key theories and practices of economic sanctions and lessons and criteria for their successful application. It will recount the impacts and effectiveness of the UDI sanctions, the impact on the government and people of Rhodesia, the region and ultimately the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. This case study will then be examined by applying theory, practice and historical context to evaluate and make recommendations with respect to economic sanctions in relation to the current situation in Zimbabwe.</p>					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Rhodesia, Coercion, SADC, UK, Embargo, Targeted, Smart, Foreign Policy, US					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>  UNLIMITED	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>  44	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> UNCLASSIFIED			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER</b> (include area code)



# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ZIMBABWE**

by

Mr. Karl E. Prinslow  
Department of Army Civilian

Colonel Thomas Sheperd  
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Mr. Karl E. Prinslow  
TITLE: Economic Sanctions and Zimbabwe  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 19 March 2010      WORD COUNT: 8,548      PAGES:44  
KEY TERMS: Rhodesia, Coercion, SADC, UK, Embargo, Targeted, Smart, Foreign Policy, US  
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The policy option of economic sanctions has become more popular and frequently invoked since the end of the Cold War. This is despite continuing debate as to their effectiveness even with the creation of new 'smart', or targeted, sanctions in response to changing geo-political conditions and situational objectives. This paper will summarize some of the key theories and practices of economic sanctions and lessons and criteria for their successful application. It will recount the impacts and effectiveness of the UDI sanctions, the impact on the government and people of Rhodesia, the region and ultimately the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. This case study will then be examined by applying theory, practice and historical context to evaluate and make recommendations with respect to economic sanctions in relation to the current situation in Zimbabwe.





## ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ZIMBABWE

Can economic sanctions succeed? The answer is that it depends on the objective(s) of the imposing states, the polity and economy of the target country and the individual(s) of the country who are making policy decisions. Consequently, economic sanctions *can* succeed or fail miserably based on the context of their use.

Objectives of economic sanctions are typically assumed to be a specific change(s) in the behavior of a foreign actor and/or its associated institutions. Other objectives may include satisfying the initiators' domestic politics or to influence third party states. Because this sanction action focuses on economics, the economic theory of supply and demand and the practices of international monetary policy are applicable and appropriate for consideration. However, psychology and individual motivations are potentially and equally important considerations, especially when dealing with autocratic or individual personality-dominated governments. All of these were exhibited in the 1965-1980 application of economic sanction towards Southern Rhodesia.

The government of Southern Rhodesia made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965 separating itself from Great Britain in response to a desire to slow or alter the constitutional transition to majority rule. The government of Great Britain immediately imposed economic sanctions on many imports and exports to/from Rhodesia. This action eventually extended to more comprehensive United Nations sanctions on 16 December 1966, resolution 232 prohibiting;

- The import from Rhodesia of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skins and leather;

- Any activities which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Rhodesia including the transfer of funds;
- The export to Rhodesia of aircraft, all types of military material and equipment and motor vehicles, oil and oil products.

As a result of the ineffectiveness of these initial sanctions, the UN adopted resolution 253 in May 1968 providing for a total embargo of trade against Rhodesia except in certain humanitarian, medical and educational cases.<sup>1</sup> Being the first effort for UN sanctions, the Rhodesian case was often used in the study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions and as the basis for theoretical analysis for the imposition of this policy option by nations and the UN in subsequent years.

This paper will summarize some of the key theories and practices of economic sanctions and lessons and criteria for their successful application. It will recount the impacts and effectiveness of the UDI sanctions, the impact on the government and people of Rhodesia, the region and ultimately the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. This case study will then be examined by applying theory, practice and historical context to evaluate and make recommendations with respect to economic sanctions in relation to the current situation in Zimbabwe.

### Economic Sanctions - Definition, Description, Theory and Lessons

Economic sanctions have been instruments of foreign policy for centuries but have gained a renewed interest for application in the post-cold war era especially given the popular perception of their effectiveness with respect to South Africa in the 1980's and early 1990's.<sup>2</sup>

Multiple views defining economic sanctions in international affairs exist.

A synthesis provides the following findings.

Economic sanctions are actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies or behavior. This action can incorporate the threat of sanctions, rewards and more typically penalties as a consequence of the targets failure to observe or comply with international standards, obligations, and norms or specifically desired standards/behavior.<sup>3</sup>

Economic sanctions are one action in the panoply of diplomatic activities available to a state in its interactions with other international actors. Imposition of economic sanctions can be imposed ad hoc by non-governmental entities, unilateral, multilateral, regional or mandated by UN Security Council resolutions, with an equally wide range of enforcement mechanisms and capacities. The intended use of economic sanctions can be to coerce, deter or punish the targeted state or select members of the targeted regime. The objective for economic sanctions is to alter political behavior by the target state or individual actors within that state for the purpose of compliance with internationally agreed upon norms, standards or law. Economic sanctions are often considered to be a non-military alternative to war involving less risk and cost--be that human, financial or moral.<sup>4</sup>

### Economic Sanctions – Theory

The theory of this method of coercion ...is that sufficient economic pressure upon the target nations(s) can induce or compel that country to more acceptable behavior...Participation in international trade has a positive real income effect that allows the consumption possibilities frontier to move beyond the domestic production curve; however any forced diminution or withdrawal from trade will tend to reduce income.<sup>5</sup>

An economic sanctions theory needs to explain how sanctions exert influence through the mechanisms of civil society and thus must be interdisciplinary.<sup>6</sup> The foreign policy practice of economic sanctions is based on a fundamental, or base, understanding about economic theory and assumptions of actor motivations. Specifically, the theory is that if country 'X' needs commodity or product(s) A,B and C, and these are restricted or cut off, then country 'X' will be motivated to change its policy/behavior. This general theory exists and is widely accepted, however, the vulnerability of targets is extremely hard to forecast and even the economic effects of the sanctions cannot be accurately estimated in advance; there are simply too many uncertainties.<sup>7</sup>

The costs imposed by sanctions may be direct, indirect, forgone potential costs, capital effects or a combination of these. To be successful the direct and indirect costs must be made intolerable in the targeted country. Most notably, Dr. Donald Losman points out that "Economic effectiveness, however, is only a necessary condition for success, not a sufficient one."<sup>8</sup> Economic sanctions generate strong societal demands for new political institutions to govern markets as well as strong political incentives for governments to provide them. Thus economic sanctions not only aid policy makers seeking to manage conflict but they also aid with understanding or shaping fundamental social behavior.<sup>9</sup>

Richard Stuart Olson writes; "the objective of most attempts at sanction is to foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both."<sup>10</sup> David Rowe, Associate Professor of Political Science at Kenyon College, focusing on the Rhodesian UDI sanctions episode, identified the creation of

internal socio-political changes, namely the creation of new institutions and posturing of political elites and constituencies, in response to economic sanctions. Noteworthy is that sanctions did not just drive economic change, but that changes to other social-political aspects had a profound impact on the target country.

### Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of economic sanctions is to restore the status quo or to alter it and establish or enforce norms of international standards or laws, for example decolonization, non-discrimination and human rights.<sup>11</sup> Coercion or punishment may be the prime objective towards the target, although symbolic condemnation can also be the intent. In addition to altering or instigating different behavior on the part of the sanction target, other purposes or objectives include: satisfying the initiator's domestic political need 'to do something' by sending a message of potential penalties to the target nation, third parties and domestic audiences for which symbolic and demonstrative functions are the most important.<sup>12</sup>

The proposal or threat of sanctions, albeit mild, can serve the purpose of raising consciousness, publicizing an issue and to force governments in international fora to define their positions publicly.<sup>13</sup> A greater cost for initiators can indicate credibility of commitment by imposing states, thus enhancing the proposal or threat of sanctions.

The principal analysis of 'success' of economic sanctions is based on the "publicly stated demands of the sanctioning governments with respect to the target actors that these governments are seeking to influence".<sup>14</sup> When analyzing a sanctions episode, the measure of success must include the *entire* array of goals that states are trying to achieve and the targets they are seeking to influence. This is because third

parties, secondary goals, implicit and (publicly) unstated goals are all likely to be significant components of sanction regimes.<sup>15</sup>

### Current Trends in Economic Sanctions and Effectiveness

In the past 18 plus years economic sanctions have become a more commonly used political action unilaterally, multilaterally and by the UN Security Council. This is especially the case with so called 'smarter' sanctions on financial assets, individual travel, arms and commodity trading.<sup>16</sup> The following trends from this recent period contribute to the popularity of 'smart' or targeted sanctions:

- The development of more effective innovations and the formulation of more targeted and selective sanctions;
- The dramatic increase in the monitoring of sanctions compliance by investigative commissions, etc.;
- The assertion of power politics and large-state national concerns in the application of the United Nations Security Council's sanction policy reform.

This means the more that sanctions target a specific faction within an internal conflict or control the trade and movement of specific commodities, the more likely it is that some among the Permanent Five will object to them.<sup>17</sup> By identifying a particular export as the focus of control, there is a greater likelihood that the dominant partner of trade in that commodity will perceive it to be in the position of carrying a higher cost burden from the sanctions, and thus object.<sup>18</sup>

- The changing nature of sanction targets and environments, to include factions in failed states and general breakdowns of human security, and the

accompanying difficulties of imposing sanctions on disintegrating economies, a shadow economy and criminalization. The economy of a failed state is, by definition, outside the boundaries of normal cross-national transactions that are regulated and functioning according to transparent and predictable procedures. Often leaders in these situations generate sufficiently high profits to absorb the extra costs imposed by sanctions and thus have very little incentive to end violence or build viable institutions and nations based on the rule of law. Contemporary targets of UN sanctions are increasingly non-state actors driven by a desire for personal enrichment and power rather than a larger political agenda. These actors derive benefits from the very economic anarchy they create, “which shields them from the effects of country specific sanctions. They have no interest in cooperating...but rather seek to circumvent international authority by a variety of ingenious and illegal means.”<sup>19</sup>

- The changing impact of *the threat* of sanctions and corresponding targets’ reactions. The threat of sanctions has elicited unexpected response, more so than the sanctions themselves. This is an indication of the way in which sanctions can influence the decision making of a regime.<sup>20</sup>
- The rising importance and prevalence of NGO’s as monitors, critics and participants in sanction policy reform.<sup>21</sup>
- The realization that an adverse impact on a national economy does not necessarily produce equivalent economic pain for the government leaders,<sup>22</sup> but that political compliance by these elite rulers was low, and the awareness

that groups within the target are affected differently and thus actions should be tailored accordingly.<sup>23</sup>

### Targeted Sanctions

Targeting individuals or governmental entities with specific economic sanctions has the goal of enhancing the political effectiveness of sanctions while minimizing unintended consequences, especially adverse humanitarian impacts.<sup>24</sup> The effectiveness of this theory is debatable as this tends to being ineffective in most instances, save as a demonstration or expression of international disapproval of the target's policy(ies). The impacts of smart sanctions must be sufficient, even if selective, to impose real costs on targeted leaders.<sup>25</sup> The smartness of sanctions and their appropriateness are linked to the legitimacy of the broader policy framework in which they are applied.<sup>26</sup> Selective sanctions do have fewer humanitarian consequences than results under comprehensive sanctions,<sup>27</sup> though political leaders often redirect the pain of sanctions onto the vulnerable, or against political opponents<sup>28</sup> regardless of whether these sanctions are selective or comprehensive.

Types of targeted sanctions include financial, travel, commodity boycotts and arms embargoes. Financial sanctions can include freezing bank accounts and financial assets. Among the difficulties with this type of sanctions is the speed of financial actions versus the lead time required to emplace sanctions through negotiations, develop a multi-lateral consensus for action and develop the institutional and legal capacity to identify, track and act on financial activity. The availability of secretive off-shore banking institutions compounds this.<sup>29</sup> The recent revelation and awareness of the expanding number and types of service institutions involved in finances (for example, insurance companies, brokerage houses, etc.) makes the effective use of this type of sanctions



even more difficult. Similarly, the cyber world of finance makes enforcement more challenging.<sup>30</sup>

The effectiveness of financial asset freeze depends on three key factors:

- Regime leaders must hold assets abroad;
- The assets must be identifiable and
- In cases where compliance rather than punishment is the goal, the assets must be a large enough proportion of the targeted individuals' total assets that the cost of defiance – the value of the blocked assets – is perceived as being larger than the political, economic, or other costs of complying with the sender's demands.<sup>31</sup>

A financial asset freeze has the most utility against corrupt dictators in poor countries who have few resources or options for accumulating new wealth and are supported by identifiable and financially vulnerable elites. Additionally, the sender is most effective when it seeks only modest changes in policy or behavior that do not threaten the targeted regime's ability to hold power.<sup>32</sup>

Travel sanctions include visa bans, individual travel bans, and sanctions on designated parastatal airlines or travel to/from a country or region. Past success has occurred when the targeted country had limited border access points and exterior travel was physically difficult. The case of Libya in the 1990's is an example.<sup>33</sup> These restrictions cause inconvenience to individuals, lost revenues to companies and their associated governments and restrict, or otherwise reduce the opportunities for privileged elites to conduct business or be involved with the international community.

Sanctions against trade in commodities, especially petroleum products, are often components of targeted and comprehensive sanctions. These are believed to be effective against countries lacking their own petroleum reserves and production. Monitoring and resultant enforcement of sanctions on commodities is especially difficult because of the interwoven complexity of international commodities trading and the difficulty of identification of commodities until packaged.

Arms embargoes have been frequently imposed but seldom enforced.<sup>34</sup> The ineffectiveness of these policy efforts is due to the immense profits available to smugglers, arms dealers and national governments and their willingness to evade or ignore national and international law.

#### Theory from Economic Sanctions Datasets

The study of economic sanctions has resulted in two principle datasets of sanction activities. The first was prepared by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (HSE) in 1990. Subsequently, and covering a longer period and broader base of events, the Conflict Management and Peace Science (CMPS) created the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) database. These utilize datasets of economic sanctions for statistical analysis.

A common argument of sanction proponents is that the cost of sanctions to the target is the key determinant for the success of a sanctions regime. That is, the higher the cost, the greater likelihood of target states change its policies. Analysis of the TIES data generally supports this hypothesis. As target costs increase, the success rate climbs, but not always. The TIES data also supports the hypothesis that the threat of sanctions and their anticipated costs to the target may be an indicator or forecast of

success, the “greater the anticipated costs to the target, the greater likelihood that the sender’s threat will be effective.”<sup>35</sup>

Another factor of analysis is cooperation -- the number of states supporting the sanctions.<sup>36</sup> The HSE data consistently shows that unilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful than those with multiple participants imposing the sanctions. Possible explanations include the small number of events, the US centric focus in the HSE dataset, and the time period covered when the US economy was more dominant in the world than it is today.<sup>37</sup> When using the TIES dataset, which covers the more recent and longer period 1971-2000, the converse is the case – multilateral sanctions are successful 55% of the time.

Initiators of sanctions are more likely to succeed when they make demands that are clear and precise. Vague demands are not as credible and do not have a significant impact. The expression of precise actions for the target to take or its behavior to change, along with credible and committed sanctions portend a better chance of success. Kirshner also identifies “exposure” or the relative vulnerability of the target with respect to the sanction. For example, in trade sanctions, success is increased the larger the ration of trade to GNP is for the target country. Thus countries for which international trade is a larger portion of their GNP are more susceptible to adverse impacts of sanctions.<sup>38</sup>

#### Implications of Theory versus Practice - Criteria for Successful Sanctions

It is often impossible to isolate the effect of sanctions as distinct from the many other domestic and international factors at work in a given situation.<sup>39</sup> One must first assess the utility and likelihood for ‘success’ of the sanctions vis-à-vis other policy alternatives. Additionally, a target cannot be assessed and dealt with as a unitary whole,

but must be analyzed by disaggregating the components of its government and society in order to identify what action will have the correct impact on the intended element(s).<sup>40</sup> David Rowe's evaluation of the Rhodesia sanctions event points out that (a) individuals not institutions make decisions; (b) sanctions exert influence by legal, social, psychological, economic and political mechanisms; (c) targets can manipulate the impact of sanctions and reorganize the government and markets to alter affected entities among domestic actors.<sup>41</sup>

An important factor concerning autocratic regimes is that the degree of bureaucratic centralization within the target state impacts the salience of both external and internal pressures."<sup>42</sup> This means that parliamentary governments may be subject to public opinion and non-democratic regimes less so. For those focusing on individual behavior the centralization of the regime makes the personalities of its leaders a critical characteristic of the target.<sup>43</sup> Keeping these issues in mind, the following highlights factors affecting the effectiveness of economic sanctions:

Sanctions alone are unlikely to achieve desired results if the aims are large or the time is short.<sup>44</sup> Different sanction measures require different lengths of time to be most productive.<sup>45</sup> For example financial restrictions may be better suited for immediate bargaining leverage, others like cultural isolation are likely to take longer to influence the social fabric of the target.<sup>46</sup> Since some goals require an immediate response while others entail slower social transformation, sanction initiators should adopt measures most appropriate for the type of behavioral, institutional or societal change they seek.<sup>47</sup> Klotz concludes that sanctions appear to be particularly appropriate for achieving political change through a process of socialization, rather than coercion.<sup>48</sup> Sanctions are

easier to introduce than to lift. Sanction fatigue tends to settle in over time, and as it does, international compliance tends to diminish.<sup>49</sup>

Sanctions can achieve or help to achieve various foreign policy goals ranging from the modest to the fairly significant, and can achieve substantive ends even if not achieving the full scope of the stated objective.<sup>50</sup> There is some evidence of greater chance for success when focused on specific reforms rather than broad declarations of change. Sanctions will inherently fail when a regime's very survival is threatened by the sanctions. One must be clear on who is the target of the sanctions--the government, the government leaders, economic elites or the general population at large?<sup>51</sup>

Sanctions are most effective when used in conjunction with other policy tools. Military enforcement can increase the impact of a given sanction (though not necessarily the political effect). Sanctions are an inappropriate response to armed aggression because they cannot replace military force. The threat of sanctions to deter behavior have little substantive effect on the target, but can achieve other objectives with the initiator or third parties. Sanctions can, however, serve as a warning and complement other measures.<sup>52</sup>

Coercive sanctions leave the initiative in the hands of the target, requiring the initiating states (for example the US) the choices of giving up, staying the course without effects or using more forceful means of coercion (for example, military force).<sup>53</sup> Punitive sanctions most always impose some cost on the target state, and can allow the initiator the option of determining the level and extent of the sanctions.

Unilateral sanctions are rarely effective<sup>54</sup> and may impose greater cost on the imposing state/economy than the target. They may also result in greater cost on third

parties, and create inter-state resentment resulting in less multilateral support. Given that target states are increasingly integrated into the globalized economy and society this results in greater difficulty for imposing isolation via economic sanctions.

Sanctions often produce unintended and undesirable consequences, both internationally and within the target country.<sup>55</sup> These range from refugees, humanitarian impact on targeted peoples and economic structural changes. It may also result in the increased militarization of government and society, import substitution, industrialization and develop a nationalized or isolationist spirit among the targeted population.<sup>56</sup>

Sanctions, by reducing the scope for independent actions, work against the forces that promote political pluralism<sup>57</sup> especially in autocratic polities. When attempting to influence political change in the target state one often confronts competing political, economic and security interests as well as the possibility of retaliation from the target state. Authoritarian states' societies are often able to withstand the effects of sanctions through one of the following reactions: rally-around the flag nationalism, enable governments to control the distribution of goods, or the creation of a sense of siege to exploit for greater government control.

#### Outcome and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions on Rhodesia

The above sections of this paper reviewed the theoretical and recent trends in the practice of using economic sanctions in international relations. The experience of applying sanctions towards Rhodesia 1965-1980 provides an excellent case study to examine these theoretical points in action.

As recounted on page one, in response to a desire to avoid the British imposed, constitutional process toward majority rule, the government of the British colony of Rhodesia pronounced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November,

1965. Almost immediately the British government imposed economic sanctions which included cessation of aid, removal of Rhodesia from the Sterling area and Commonwealth preference system, and placed a ban on trade in tobacco, sugar and petroleum. The United Nations called upon all nations to withhold recognition of the new government and render Rhodesia no assistance. A week later (20 November) it requested all nations break general economic relations with Rhodesia.<sup>58</sup>

This was later followed with more severe measures when, on December 16, 1965, the UN invoked mandatory economic sanctions for the first time in its history.<sup>59</sup> In May 1968 the UN Security Council banned the import of any and all Rhodesian goods by other nations and prohibited the sale and /or supply of any goods to Rhodesia (except for humanitarian and medical supplies) due to the lack of effectiveness to date.<sup>60</sup>

The UN's interests and objectives in imposing sanctions mirrored those of the British government. Namely this guaranteed unimpeded progress toward majority rule, as already contained in the 1961 constitution; guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution; immediate improvement of the political status of the African; progress toward the cessation of racial discrimination; acceptance of the proposed basis for independence by the people of Rhodesia as a whole; no oppression of the majority by the minority or vice versa, regardless of race.<sup>61</sup>

The Rhodesian economy included mining, farming of diversified agricultural cash crops by white commercial farmers, and had achieved self sufficiency in sugar, milk, dairy and was an exporter of corn (maize) and cattle. World War II prompted a demand for and spurred the expansion of domestic manufacturing and other industries. Mining

included asbestos, chromium, gold, copper, iron ore, coal, coke and tin.<sup>62</sup> This diversity enabled it to be less susceptible to the impact of sanctions. Rhodesia had no petroleum and imported all of its requirements.

Sanctions had multiple effects on multiple targets as the regime developed. The actual impacts or 'adjustments' on Rhodesia as a result of the sanctions against it included: An increasingly diversified Rhodesian economy; An altered the Rhodesian domestic political makeup; The creation of institutions with more control of the economy, production, exports, import and fiscal controls; Income shifting within Rhodesia to ensure political supporters (whites) maintained their income and politically less significant population (blacks) incurred the higher costs; Increased unemployment became a contributing factor to revolutionary group recruitment. The impacts on other countries included higher costs by the Frontline states (Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique) for enforcing sanctions. They eventually relented to maintaining substantially normal trade relations with Rhodesia and sanction busting by commercial companies and national efforts, especially by South Africa on petroleum products which diminished the overall effect of sanctions.

Given the need for Rhodesia to import all of its petroleum, the British government and the UN, publicly expected an oil embargo to impart short term sanction success. The UK also overestimated the effects and underestimated the ability of import substitution to counter its economic sanctions.<sup>63</sup> Oil company franchises in South Africa continued to provide Rhodesian oil requirements and processed the bulk of Rhodesian oil needs for the first ten years of sanctions in response to British efforts to block trade through the port of Beira. This RSA effort also resulted in the creation of a new rail link



through Beit Bridge on the RSA-Rhodesia border. In private, neither the British nor the U.S. governments expected the oil embargo to be effective, and due to the threat of counter sanction from South Africa, the British were not willing to punish South African sanction busting actions.

Economic crisis generates societal demands for policy and serves as “the midwife for institutional change”.<sup>64</sup> It alters the configuration of interest in the political economy, making possible the forging of new political coalitions.<sup>65</sup> Economic change informs the political interests of politicians. It creates opportunities for them to organize, disrupt or otherwise shape economic interests as they seek political power. The immediate ineffectiveness of sanctions resulted from the British objective being a policy change by the regime of the Rhodesian Front (RF) party government that would have resulted in its demise. I

n response to sanctions, the Rhodesian government implemented exchange controls, import restrictions and the rationing of some products, especially gasoline. The government altered both the sectoral origins of national economic output and the distribution of the economy's internal adjustment to sanctions which altered the distribution of labor and income. The Rhodesians countered economic sanctions by adaptation, reduction of external dependence and the development of new links with non-sanctioning states. The government created new controls on imports, rationing of raw materials, control of labor and monetary and fiscal policies. Sanctions and these measures were a stimulant to domestic production. As a result of impacting normal channels of supply, sanctions were a forcing function for expanding industrial, manufacturing and agriculture. By 1971, exports regained their 1965 level, admittedly at

lower product price levels to maintain or ensure competitiveness, and paying a higher price for imports.<sup>66</sup> Between 1965 and 1975 Strack notes that Rhodesian manufacturing increased 88% and the number of products went from 88 to 3837.<sup>67</sup> The white business community was able to mediate the imposed import and export limitations and resultant cost changes.<sup>68</sup>

The Rhodesian experience also supports the theory that withdrawal from trade tends to increase relative rates of return to owners of capital and skilled labor and reduces returns to unskilled labor.<sup>69</sup> In Rhodesia's case, sanctions reduced the absolute level of living of Africans, while at the same time increasing the absolute level of living of whites.<sup>70</sup> These non-economic repercussions of sanctions resulted in the exercise of governmental controls over individual civil and political rights.<sup>71</sup> This caused a deterioration in racial relations as well as growth in African unemployment and the repatriation of non-local blacks. These circumstances, and the blacks' frustration of sanctions not delivering promised majority rule, contributed to black Rhodesian's support for terrorism and the insurgency.

The Rhodesian government accommodated change and created new economic institutions in response to the opportunity of the crisis and demands of the white electorate. The Rhodesian political leadership capitalized on the opportunity of international sanctions to aid in solidifying popular (electorate) support with a perceived 'defender of the nation' or laager ('circle-the-wagons') mentality. Margaret Doxey notes that this creation or development of a defiant reaction toward the international community, or just the imposing nation, may result in less readiness to compromise or willingness to reach a peaceful solution.<sup>72</sup>

In his study of the UDI sanctions regime, David M. Rowe concludes that economic security is structurally determined by domestic political process, the key issues for which is how national politicians exploit this vulnerability as they compete for power within the country's institutions.<sup>73</sup> One outcome of an economic crisis opportunity is the chance to build new institutions that suppress domestic dissent and build networks of resilient political support.<sup>74</sup> The government can use its monopoly position over imports to reward friends, punish opponents and thus rate networks of political loyalty. Rowe's seminal work on the Rhodesian sanctions episode recounts how that government did so in great detail.<sup>75</sup>

Economic sanctions can only be characterized as a 'failure' in temporal terms in so far as their imposition did not cause the desired change in Rhodesian political structure immediately or even in the short term. However, these sanctions were a significant contributing factor to eventually compelling the Rhodesian government to accept majority rule. This assertion is based on the dominance of contending with sanctions throughout the UDI period as evidenced by Rhodesia near continuous bargaining with Britain. "...over time they (sanctions) led to shortages of capital goods and foreign investment that impeded growth and made the economy extremely vulnerable to the oil and commodity shocks of the mid-1970's".<sup>76</sup> Sanctions caused elements of the business community to talk with nationalist groups and encouraged unemployed men to seek redress through the revolutionary groups. Following years of economic sanctions and civil war, the white minority government reached accommodation with the black majority through a series of agreements resulting in the

election of President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. This formed the first independence government of the Republic of Zimbabwe in February 1980.

#### Current situation in Zimbabwe and Sanctions

Zimbabwe today is an economic and political mess, and the United States has limited options in addressing its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. No amount of optimism negates the real possibility of the ZANU-PF party and Mugabe's personally controlled forces therein reverting to continuing oppression and repressive authoritarian practices.

Despite hope for improved economic activity and success, President Mugabe's presence remains a cloud over international acceptance and the development of a welcoming environment for international and domestic capital investment. Along with political uncertainty, the country suffers from an economic crisis exemplified by a 50% decrease in GDP since 2000, an inflation rate over 200 million percent in 2008,<sup>77</sup> unemployment over 80% and a nonexistent or at best a nonfunctioning health care system resulting in HIV/AIDS prevalence rate over 15% and outbreak of cholera killing over 4000 people in 2007-2008. These cumulative disasters have also resulted in the loss via emigration of nearly 15% of the nation's people, to include much of its healthcare professionals and educators.<sup>78</sup>

Subsequent to the early post-independence years of hope for a Mugabe ZANU-PF multi-racial democracy and its economic progress, President Mugabe became increasingly oppressive and autocratic in ruling Zimbabwe, which he increasingly treated as a personal fiefdom. Tony Hawkins of the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) characterizes Zimbabwe as an example of crony capitalism in that the private sector has been communalized and state controls are in place for, bank credit, prices and

wages and access to foreign exchange. This is designed to ensure that ZANU-PF members profit first and foremost and distribution of food relief benefits the party electorate.<sup>79</sup>

In response to deteriorating economic conditions in the 1990's the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was founded and succeeded in defeating a year 2000 referendum expanding executive powers. This defeat did not prevent Mugabe's continuing government sanctioned seizures of white owned commercial farms, causing additional loss of production, foreign exchange, domestic food supplies and broader emigration.<sup>80</sup>

The March 2008 national elections were determined to have been won by the opposition MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, but without a full majority. International observers characterized the elections as "a credible expression of the will of the people" while others found them to be "chaotic" and "deeply flawed" in which violence, intimidation and access to food, or denial thereof, were political tools by Mugabe's ZANU-PF party.

More than two months later than constitutionally required, a runoff election was scheduled for June 2008, but was boycotted by Tsvangirai to both protest the ongoing violence and not put any more of his supporters at risk of injury or death. The election and resultant Mugabe inauguration on 29 June were assessed as flawed by observers from the United Nations, African Union and SADC.

On 15 September 2008, Tsvangirai and Mugabe agreed to a SADC negotiated power-sharing agreement, the Global Political Agreement (GPA), by which Tsvangirai would serve as prime minister and form an inclusive government with President

Mugabe. The parties reached a final agreement in January 2009 and the coalition, or government of unity, took office on 11 February 2009 with Robert Mugabe continuing as President and Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. Cabinet level positions were divided among the political parties. Of 33 Ministers, 14 were allocated to the MDC, 3 to a MDC breakaway faction led by Arthur Mutambara and 15 to ZANU-PF.<sup>81</sup>

Subsequent to the September 2008 power sharing arrangement between the ZANU-PF (Mugabe) and MDC-T (Tsvangirai) the new government took drastic actions concerning banking, fiscal and monetary policies, implemented cash budgeting and suspended the Zimbabwe currency and accepted international hard currencies as the coin of the realm, paying civil servants with US dollar denominated vouchers. Actions by Finance Minister Biti, of the MDC-T, have given international financial institutions and governments greater confidence in the Government of Zimbabwe's (GOZ) seriousness to address uncontrolled inflation and adjust its fiscal and monetary policy. Additionally, gold and other commodity producers were authorized to sell bullion. The collection of these measures has removed most of the currency risk for foreign investors. The IMF has adopted an upbeat tone stating that Zimbabwe is experiencing "a nascent economic recovery".<sup>82</sup> Early results are positive as measured by the elimination of inflation, return of some teachers and civil servants to work and cautious but favorable international assessments. Other recent policy proposals include the Finance Minister Biti (MDC Party) wanting to pursue HIPC and resultant forgiveness of debt.

Human rights however, have been repressed or openly and wholly disregarded by the ruling ZANU-PF government ministries, security and law enforcement organs. These acts range from suppressing the freedoms of speech, press and assembly to

beatings and killing of opposition candidates and their supporters. Their actions also include withholding access to humanitarian food supplies from regions supporting opposition parties.<sup>83</sup>

The policy and practice of the United States has been to be a vocal critic of Mugabe's practices and a supporter of UN, AU and SADC efforts to intervene and mediate with the Government of Zimbabwe. Presently the US maintains economic sanctions and is increasing assistance and financing for humanitarian assistance, legal reforms, and the reconstitution of education and healthcare infrastructures. The United States government seeks the Government of Zimbabwe to comply with United Nations' resolutions and abide by international standards of human rights; equal access to humanitarian assistance; respect of democratic methods and transparent governance; and compliance with its own constitution and the general respect of rule of law and macroeconomic stabilization.

On March 6, 2003 the United States imposed smart, or targeted, sanctions on selected individuals of the Zimbabwean government. These were reinforced and expanded in 2005, both with respect to the scope of sanctions as well as the number of people and business entities targeted. These U.S. economic sanctions were further expanded on July 25, 2008 in response to the controversial election of June 2008. This expansion took the form of expanding the Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) list and on the types of activities sanctioned.<sup>84</sup>

The unified actions by the countries of southern Africa, and other nations of the world, successfully blocked a Chinese sourced arms shipment to Zimbabwe during the period April-May 2008. On July 8, 2008 the Group of Eight (G8) agreed to impose

sanctions against the Mugabe regime. The U.S. sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council for internationally applied, targeted sanctions on 14 members of the Mugabe regime and an international arms embargo. This was vetoed by Russia and China accompanied by South Africa, Libya and Vietnam. In spite of the power sharing agreement, the US government retains the sanctions against Mugabe, his associates, and other governmental/parastatal entities.

According to the US Presidential declaration, these sanctions are in response to persons who undermine Zimbabwe's democratic processes or institutions, prior to and including the June 27, 2008 election, via the commitment of acts of violence and human rights abuse toward political opponents. Additionally, these sanctions are directed to people who are engaged in public corruption.<sup>85</sup> These sanctions impose targeted sanctions against 33 business 'entities' associated with ruling party members of the government of Zimbabwe and consist of financial and visa sanctions against 138 individuals. They also include a ban on trade in defense articles and services but do not prohibit the provision of assistance through NGO's and other third parties.<sup>86</sup>

#### Rhodesia vs Zimbabwe –Economic Sanctions Event Comparison

Although the physical geography of Zimbabwe remains the same as that of Rhodesia in the 1965-1980 period, the reasons and results of applying economic sanctions are markedly different.

The objectives of the UK and the UN when imposing sanctions on Rhodesia after UDI boiled down to gaining majority rule in accordance with international standards and norms and the 1961 constitution. This was supported by other new African states. A majority of the members of the UN supported this burgeoning group of independent



states. Along with achieving majority rule the UK wanted to send a message to third party states demonstrating its support of their shared interests.

The current policy objectives of the US, and the other nations imposing sanctions, are less tangible or measurable -- compliance with human rights, elimination of oppression of political opposition, respect of democratic methods and transparent governance, compliance with its own constitution and the general respect of rule of law, macroeconomic stabilization and economic prosperity. These objectives more importantly imply the demise of ZANU-PF regime to obtain recognized successful compliance. The nature of these objectives make it more difficult for the Zimbabwean regime to comply as well as for the US to determine that they have been met and thus to justify lifting sanctions. Consequently, the nature of these objectives mitigates against sanctions alone being successful.

During the period of UDI economic sanctions were comprehensive and focused on trade. The sanctions under UDI period affected a wide swath of society and impacted almost every sector of the population vice just the decision making elites. The government, electorate and marketplace reacted/responded with new political institutions, economic control boards and Government controlled distribution of goods, labor and financial exchange controls. The government divided the white electorate and altered income distribution among the population. Eventually the economic sanctions, in concert with other exogenous events, resulted in rising unemployment of Africans becoming a fruitful pool for recruits to the insurgents. The concomitant resulting shortage of capital goods and foreign investment moved white businessmen to talks with these same revolutionary forces.

Current sanctions are targeted to selected individuals and elements of the ruling regime, but not all party members. It excludes breakaway or internal ZANU-PF opposition members who should instead be targets of support in order to disaggregate the elites.<sup>87</sup> The sanction target is a total of 138 people and only focuses on financial assets and their travel. Consequently, these sanctions will have the desired effect only if these restrictions adversely impact the targeted people or otherwise raise their personal and institutional costs.<sup>88</sup>

Because of the years that have lapsed and incomplete nature of the sanctions since their imposition in 2003, the financial assets of Mugabe and the other targets are either not under the control of the initiators or are of insufficient value to adversely impact the targeted individuals. They have also been able to void the sanction's impact by wielding personal wealth through internal business activities and accessing foreign aid funds.<sup>89</sup>

Regardless of financial means, Mugabe also receives much power and personal support via external actors. Former President Mbeki of South Africa and favorable expansion of trade and relations with China and Chinese and Russian support in the UN exemplify this point.<sup>90</sup> Although these external relations are not members of the Zimbabwe electorate, and thus do not impact regime stability through elections, these relationships can be manipulated by the government and/or party controlled press to raise up Mugabe in the eyes of the people. Some of the sanctions' targeted individuals have been able to avoid or circumvent sanctions and conduct international travel to either regional or international conferences or for financial meetings.<sup>91</sup>

Much as David Rowe posits and describes the responses and changes by the Rhodesia UDI government, one can argue that the Mugabe/ZANU-PF GOZ responded to current economic sanctions, and other inputs, by creating new political institutions such as the GPA as a means of mediating international pressures<sup>92</sup>, of which sanctions were one component. Mugabe's power base are party members and the internal security and military forces. Mugabe has had to reinforce and maintain their loyalty. New economic policies such as the indigenization of businesses, are a means of providing ways for wealth accumulation for regime supporters<sup>93</sup> which maintains their core support.

If one seeks to find a positive impact of these sanctions, and the international support for sanctions, we may be limited to the intangible effect of advertising external disgust with Mugabe's actions. However, the accompanying or resultant international withdrawal of regime support<sup>94</sup> potentially contributed to the acceptance and conclusion of the GPA and its resultant power sharing agreement.

The following aspects of the situation, as born to date, in relation to the sanctions regime, portend towards the probable lack of sanctions' success. The creation of a shadow economy, and the criminalization of the economy by targeted regime members and the indigenization of business have all created opportunities for regime members to capitalize on oppressive policies, such as removal of commercial farm lands, and profit from the imbalanced economy. Economic sanctions theory suggests that an asset freeze should have the greatest utility against a regime with a high degree of centralization because there is a greater importance of personality of leader and less importance of public opinion.<sup>95</sup> This theoretical reaction to Zimbabwe's non-democratic

leader in Mugabe is not readily apparent as a response to current sanctions. Again, a possible explanation for this is that the targeted assets are not under the control of the country(ies) imposing sanctions. Instead, the targets have been able to enrich themselves and their core supporters sufficiently without accessing foreign controlled assets, possibly by re-allocating resources within Zimbabwe, such as farmland, which the government or regime is able to access or control. The other explanation is that financial leverage is good only for immediate bargaining, the time for which has already passed and therefore the effect is nil.<sup>96</sup>

Most of these sanctions have been in effect for over six years with minimal discernible effect on Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. Arguments that economic sanctions are the source of Zimbabwe's economic ills reflect only the advocate's lack of understanding of the sanctions and their limited applications. The exception to this logic is the argument that the US and other initiators too strongly influence the IMF and World Bank and their resultant policies and restrictions of support to Zimbabwe.<sup>97</sup> Other reasons that the US economic sanctions are less than effective are because the targeted individuals are able to avoid or ignore specific elements or these elements have negligible cost to the target.<sup>98</sup> The travel ban is weak because alternatives to air travel exist, and is not widely supported. The result is that Mugabe retains the ability to attend forums which feed his legitimacy.<sup>99</sup> The restriction on arms transfers appears to have been enforced, although its attempted violation by China with South African government complicity indicates it too remains vulnerable to sanctions busting actions by outside actors.<sup>100</sup>

## Conclusions, Recommendations

Economic sanctions have the best chance to succeed against small countries or those dependent on sanction initiators, when the demanded change is not threatening to the regime or does not require significant social upheaval, is targeted against specific individuals or groups with the power to effect the change, and has the appropriate timing and sanctions initiators have the credibility of commitment to execute the sanctions. Based on this research, realizing the required conditions for a sanctions policy to succeed (achieve the initiator's objectives), the current political-economic situation in Zimbabwe provides several conclusions about the application of economic sanctions.

First, comprehensive sanctions will have a deleterious effects on the people and economy. The cost to the people of Zimbabwe would be great, but the decision making elite will be able to avoid the costs and defer them to less fortunate and less powerful individuals and groups. Targeted sanctions against the Mugabe regime members will, by themselves, be ineffective for the desired policy and behavioral changes. However, they are valuable as a means of communicating dissatisfaction. Multilateral targeted sanctions, especially UN mandated sanctions, will be more effective in this regard. UN debate, even without mandating sanctions, can force other nations to voice their position and take a stand. As a result they can be a valuable complement to other actions.

Second, given the nature of the GPA government, some new government decision makers are not of the ZANU-PF, and are supportive of policies and objectives sought by sanction imposing governments and the UN. This situation warrants targeted sanctions against ZANU-PF leadership and the Mugabe regimes leadership. The

current list of targeted individuals, on the SDN list, is correct and fulfills the requirement to identify the decision making elite and hold them responsible with respect to their decisions or behaviors under question.

Thirdly, successful sanctions require clear and precise objectives. Currently the objectives are unclear and vaguely refer to compliance with democratic ideals. One may argue that the June 2008 election results have now been sanctioned by the GPA, and in turn the international community, thus democratic practices have been followed. This kind of logic makes the current sanctions' objectives vague, difficult to enforce, or comply with and more importantly, makes determination of effectiveness extremely difficult.

To improve the effectiveness of a sanctions regime having an effect on the behavior of the Mugabe regime one must consider the wider range of sanction actions beyond just economics. These include domestic, social, international, financial, strategic and cultural sanctions.<sup>101</sup> Economic restrictions must proceed to the point of economic isolation of the targets. Social sanctions can pressure the government through a process of political delegitimization.<sup>102</sup> Diplomatic and social delegitimization will be key in this case due to the integration of regional trade, structural ties and the resulting economic cooperation necessary for neighboring countries to survive and prosper. .

Lastly, practitioners of economic sanctions would do well to focus on the indirect consequences of sanctions, especially in targeted societies.<sup>103</sup> Targeted sanctions towards Mugabe et al may have several results. These second orders effects include:

- Loss of access to foreign exchange funds that truly belong to the government and not the individuals themselves.

- Third party support for Mugabe and ZANU-PF as legacy independence fighters and thus a lessening of support for sanctions within the international community.
- Lack of return of the Zimbabwean diaspora, resulting in significantly slower growth or return to growth and years of reliance on international aid and possible decline into a failed state, contrary to the desire of the imposition of sanctions.
- Humanitarian aid may enable continued regime survival due to lessening the societal cost. It is also possible for draconian measures resulting in taxing or theft of aid. Concurrent with this possibility may be the creation of new organizations and controls by the government to diffuse or redirect the adverse effects of sanctions.

However, given the difficulty in measuring success, sanctions may also result in President Mugabe realizing that his legacy is better served by retirement and national service as a mentor from the sidelines. Given his previous opportunities and encouragement to do so without taking it, this remains unlikely.

This paper examined economic sanctions theory and the literature on case histories, especially Rhodesia's UDI sanctions episode, and the current status of smart or targeted sanctions. Having done so, one concludes the current targeted sanctions against selected Zimbabwe leadership do not prevent their behavior from exceeding the bounds of international norms. Sanctions busting by individuals and their collective polity is rife. Targeted sanctions only have the effect of bringing awareness to the international community the dissatisfaction of members, and causes the others to

examine their own actions and relationship with the targets. This reflection has resulted in international condemnation, ostracism and additional calls for regime change in accordance with the rule of law. Arguably this contributed to the successful negotiation of the GPA and the subsequent, current government, which has shown signs of changing policies and actions to align more with the desired international standards and expectations.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Report of the Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Office, "Implementation of Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia," 20 April, 1977, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Audie Klotz, "Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons," in *How Sanctions Work, Lessons from South Africa*, ed. Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz (St Martins Press, New York, 1998).

<sup>3</sup> According to T. Clifton Morgan, economic sanctions are actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies. By definition a sanction must (1) involve one or more sender states and a target state, and (2) be implemented by the sender in order to change the behavior of the target state. (T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat and Valentin Krustev. "The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Volume 26(1): 94.) Dr. Donald Losman, professor of Economics and Middle East Studies at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, defines economic sanctions as "trade and financial penalties inflicted by boycotting states for the purpose of coercing the target nation(s) to comply with desired ends of the boycott initiators." (Donald L. Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), 124.) David Rowe's definition of economic sanctions incorporates the component of threat; the deliberate withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations, noting that the threat alone may cause an alteration in target state behavior, not necessarily towards the desired objective. (David M. Rowe, "Economic Sanctions do Work: Economic Statecraft and the oil Embargo of Rhodesia," *Security Studies*, 9:1, 286. (Huffbauer Schott, *Elliott Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* 1985 edition, page 2 quoted in Rowe page 286). Galtung focuses on the effects aspect allowing for positive sanctions (rewards and inducements) as well as familiar negative sanctions (penalties). Margaret Doxey emphasizes the importance of sanctions from violent or non-violent techniques employed specifically to further the interests of one or more states at the expense of others."<sup>3</sup> She also defines international sanctions as penalties threatened or imposed as a consequence of the target's failure to observe international standards, obligations standards of behavior and norms. (Margaret P. Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987, 4.) David Baldwin, noted by Margaret Doxey



(Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 4.), notes a common meaning of the term 'economic sanctions';

- (1) Use of economic measures to enforce international law;
- (2) The types of values...intended to be reduced or augmented in the target state;
- (3) Concept of economic techniques of statecraft defined as governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money;

<sup>4</sup> Richard N. Haass, ed. *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 2.

<sup>5</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 124.

<sup>6</sup> David M. Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press), 4. "...legal, social, psychological, economic and political; hence building such a theory is an interdisciplinary exercise..."

<sup>7</sup> Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 98-99.

<sup>8</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 125.

<sup>9</sup> David M. Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia*, viii.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Stuart Olson, "Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations," *World Politics* 31, (July 1979): 471-479.

<sup>11</sup> Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 91.

<sup>12</sup> Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 9. The CSIS expressed similar conclusions in their 1999 study "Altering U.S. Sanctions Policy, final report of the CSIS project on unilateral Economic Sanctions", February 1999, vi.

<sup>13</sup> Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 94.

<sup>14</sup> David M. Rowe, "Economic Sanctions do Work: Economic Statecraft and the oil Embargo of Rhodesia," *Security Studies* 9:1, 255.

<sup>15</sup> Rowe, "Economic Sanctions do Work," 256.

<sup>16</sup> David Cortright, George A. Lopez and Linda Gerber, *Sanctions and the Search for Security, Challenges to UN Action*, (Boulder, CO: International Peace Academy), 2.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 13-15.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>21</sup> Richard Stuart Olson writes; “the objective of most attempts at sanction is to foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both.” Olson, Richard Stuart, “Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations,” *World Politics* 31 (July 1979), 474. Also see Cortright, Lopez and Gerber, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Cortright, Lopez and Gerber, *Sanctions and the Search for Security, Challenges to UN Action*, 3.

<sup>23</sup> Jonathan Kirshner, *The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions*, *Security Studies*, 6: 3, 32-64.

<sup>24</sup> David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 1-2.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>28</sup> Cortright and Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*, 6. This premise is the basis of the principal theory explained and supported in David Rowe’s study of Rhodesian sanctions. See David M. Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press).

<sup>29</sup> Cortright and Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*, 29-31.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 177.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 179.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 1-14.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>35</sup> T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat and Valentin Krustev. “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no.1: 102.

<sup>36</sup> Many authors use the characterizations of unilateral and multilateral however Jonathan Kirshner broadens the characterization with the term ‘cooperation’ which more accurately reflects the relationship and not just the number of participants in a policy action. Jonathan Kirshner, *The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions*, *Security Studies*, 6: 3, 32-64.

<sup>37</sup> Morgan, Bapat and Krustev. "The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000," 103.

<sup>38</sup> Kirshner, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," 35.

<sup>39</sup> Richard N. Haass, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, (Washington, DC: A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1998), 4.

<sup>40</sup> Kirshner, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," 35.

<sup>41</sup> David M. Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press), 5-6. Many if not all of these same conclusions of sanctions success were reached by the CSIS in their report, "Beyond Unilateral Sanctions, Better Alternatives for U.S. Foreign Policy", March 1999, x-xi.

<sup>42</sup> Audie Klotz, "Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons," in *How Sanctions Work* eds. by Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 277.

<sup>43</sup> Klotz, "Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons," 278.

<sup>44</sup> Haass, *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, 197 and Klotz, 64.

<sup>45</sup> Klotz, *Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons*, 279.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 280.

<sup>49</sup> Haass, *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, 205. In examining sanctions against South Africa in the 1980's and 1990's Audie Klotz identifies lessons of sanctions are focused on (a) international norms, (b) domestic characteristics of the target and (c) timeframes for applying sanctions. Audie Klotz's analysis of sanctions provides additional perspective focusing on the larger range of impacts, which a potential imposer should consider prior to the imposition of sanctions;1 – consider a broader range of targets of influence beyond governments, especially social movements.2 – successful sanctions will draw upon a more comprehensive array of mechanisms, including influencing along social dimensions.3 – with respect to international human rights norms, sanctions appear to be particularly appropriate for achieving political change through a process of socialization, rather than coercion. He also notes that some norms are impossible to enforce through coercion because the goal requires social transformation. See Audie Klotz, "Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons" in *How Sanctions Work, Lessons from South Africa*, eds. Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, 274-276.

<sup>50</sup> Haass, *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, 198.

<sup>51</sup> Klotz, *Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons*, 278.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 274.

<sup>53</sup> Haass, *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, 199.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 200.

<sup>55</sup> Haass, *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*, 201. and Klotz, *Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons*, 264.

<sup>56</sup> Klotz, *Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons*, 264.

<sup>57</sup> Haass, 205.

<sup>58</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 94.

<sup>59</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 94. Specifically proscribing imports of the following products from Rhodesia; asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat products, hides, skins, and exports of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles and oil supplies to Rhodesia was prohibited. This list impacted approximately only about 40% of Rhodesia's exports. Additionally, exceptions were made for in-place contracts.

<sup>60</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 94.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 92-93.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 84-86.

<sup>63</sup> Timothy Curtin and David Murray, *Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia* (Levittown, NY: Transatlantic Arts, Inc.), 4.

<sup>64</sup> Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia*, 14.

<sup>65</sup> Peter Gourevitch quoted in David M. Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press), 14.

<sup>66</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 103.

<sup>67</sup> H. Strack, *Sanctions the Case of Rhodesia* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1978), 90.

<sup>68</sup> Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia*, 165- 171.

<sup>69</sup> Losman, *International Economics Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*, 112-113.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 113.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 119.

<sup>72</sup> Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 116.

<sup>73</sup> Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia*, 15-16.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 31. Rowe offers three general propositions; – Economic sanctions will create significant collective action dilemmas for the groups who suffer windfall losses, thereby generating the (sometimes latent) political demand for new institutions that resolve these dilemmas by using the power of the state to compel individuals to act in the collective economic interest. – These institutions will enhance the power of the government over market actors...can also be exploited by the government to suppress political dissent and reward political loyalty among this group. – Economic sanctions will lead to the increasing penetration of the economy by government agencies, the submersion of domestic political dissent, a narrowing of the political space within which opponents can mount challenges to the government or its policies, and the apparent closing of loyal ranks behind the target government.

<sup>76</sup> Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia*, 8.

<sup>77</sup> As a result of dollarization, accepting foreign hard currency in lieu of the Zimbabwe dollar, the current 2009 inflation is essentially nil.

<sup>78</sup> Lauren Ploch, *Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service report for Congress 7-5700, RL34509, 25 March 2009. Also Lauren Ploch, *Zimbabwe*, CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700, RL32723, 1 April 2009.

<sup>79</sup> Tony Hawkins, *Zimbabwe: the Long Road to Recovery*, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, March 2008, 12.

<sup>80</sup> Open CRS. CRS Reports for the People. *Zimbabwe*, 1 April 2009, RL32723. URL [HTTP://opencrs.com/document/RL32723](http://opencrs.com/document/RL32723). Accessed 8 October 2009.

<sup>81</sup> "Zimbabwe: Politics versus People," *African Business*, March 2009, 48-9.

<sup>82</sup> Sarah Rundell, "Mining and 'dollarisation' stimulate economy," *African Business*, November 2009, 24-26.

<sup>83</sup> Human Rights Watch, *False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power Sharing Government's Failure to Deliver Human Rights Improvement, August 2009*, 1-56432-532-6.

<sup>84</sup> Ploch, *Zimbabwe*, CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700, RL32723, 1 April 2009, 29.

<sup>85</sup> Presidential Documents, *Executive Order 13469 of July 25, 2008*. (Washington, DC: Federal Register, Volume 73, No. 146, Tuesday July 29, 2008).

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia* and Kirshner, *The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions*, 35.

<sup>88</sup> Rowe and Kirshner talk about disaggregating elites. Rowe, *Manipulating the Market, Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia* and Kirshner, *The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions*, 35.

<sup>89</sup> Allegations and some specifics are provided by Stephanie Hanson, *Zimbabwe's Security Sector*, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June 2008, URL: <http://www.cfr.org/publications/15793/>. Accessed 12 November 2009. According to Africa Confidential ZANU-PF leading members were transferring tens of millions to safe havens in June-July 2008 in anticipation of sanctions being tightened. Africa Confidential, "ZANU-PF stashes the cash", 49:15 18 July 2008, 1.

<sup>90</sup> Tendai Dumbutshena, "ANC, not Mbeki, has big role to play", the Zimbabwe Times, 15 July 2008. URL: <http://www.thezimbabwestimes.com/?p=897>. Accessed 15 December 2009.

<sup>91</sup> President Mugabe was able to attend a meeting of the Africa Union at Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt in July 2008 during which he confronted his detractors and critics by asking them to prove their democratic credentials. The ZANU-PF member and Finance Minister, Gideon Gono, travelled to London during 2009 for meetings with financial institutions, and was noted by the British press that this was in contravention of UK sanctions. See Kennedy Abwao, "Undeterred by Criticism, Mugabe Joins Peers at African Union Meeting," New York Times, 1 July 2008." URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01zimbabwe.html?fta=y>. Accessed 18 January 2010.

<sup>92</sup> An example of this pressure is that provided by President Raila Odinga of Kenya. See Kennedy Abwao and Alan Cowell, "Mugabe joins African Union summit, New York Times, July 2008, URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01iht-01zimbabwe.14115395.html>. Accessed 15 January 2010.

<sup>93</sup> This thought is based on the theories and lessons posed by Rowe, *Manipulating the Market* and Kirshner, *Microfoundations*.

<sup>94</sup> Robert Nisbet, "Zimbabwe Faces UN Sanctions Vote" Sky News, 10 July 2008. URL: <http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/United-Nations-Security-Council-May-Vote-On-Sanctions-Against-Zimbabwe-President-Robert-Mugabe/Article/200807215029972?f=rss>. Accessed 17 December 2009.

<sup>95</sup> Klotz, *Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons* 279.

<sup>96</sup> This attitude was conveyed by a sanctioned member of the regime in 2005 when the original sanctions were expanded by the US. Redorbit News, "Zimbabwe: Government: US Sanctions List as 'Inconsequential'", URL: <http://www.redorbit.com/modules/news/tools.php?tool=print&id=313854>. Accessed 15 December 2009.

<sup>97</sup> This argument about the ability of the US and UK to influence the IMF and World Bank and effectively extending the targeted sanctions to become more comprehensive economic

sanctions is presented by Tawanda Hondora, "Economic sanctions undermine Zimbabwe's economy." Newzimbabwe.com. <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/sanctions32.13170.html>. Accessed 7 December 2009. Dr Gideon Gono, Reserve Bank Governor, presents the same arguments in African Business, "Dr Gideon Gono: how sanctions are ruining Zimbabwe," African Business, June 2007, 48. The credibility of the argument is lessened in light of current, February 2010, discussion by the IMF board to restore Zimbabwe's voting rights. Suzanne Presto, IMF Considering Restoring Zimbabwe's Voting rights", VOAnews.com, 19 Feb 2010. URL: <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/west/IMF-Considering-Restoring-Zimbabwes-Voting-Rights-84798307.html>, accessed 25 February 2010.

<sup>98</sup> Africa Confidential cited by The Zimbabwe Times, "Mugabe's men stash cash abroad", 22 July 2008. URL: <http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=1202>. Accessed 15 January 2010. Also Africa Confidential, "Mugabe's men stash cash", Vol 49, 15, 18 July 2008. URL: <http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/2707/No-Title>. Accessed 21 February 2010.

<sup>99</sup> President Mugabe has been able to attend UN, SADC and AU meetings and even Commonwealth meetings in 2009. Finance Minister Gideon Gono in November 2009. "Mugabe's banker beats sanctions with UK trip". Newzimbabwe.com. <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/sanctions10.11960.html> Accessed 7 December 2009.

<sup>100</sup> Celia W. Dugger. "Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar", New York Times, 19 April 2008. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/world/africa/19zimbabwe.html>. Accessed 15 December 2009. Also see Mark Tran. "Zimbabwe arms shipment returns to China". The Guardian, 24 April 2008. URL: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/24/zimbabwe.china>. Accessed 15 December 2009.

<sup>101</sup> Klotz, Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons, 267.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, 268.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, 273.

